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The existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product 
differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes 
that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship 
between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in 
contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling 
framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: optimal collusion on 
discriminatory prices; optimal collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to 
discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third 
collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the 
critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the 
product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that suboptimal collusion is more 
difficult to sustain than optimal collusion. 
.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Product differentiation affects both the way in which the firms compete and the way 
in which they collude. When the firms produce differentiated goods, their pricing 
decisions depend on the substitutability between the products: if the products are good 
substitute no firm can command a high price for its product. Therefore, the lower is the 
product differentiation degree the lower is the non-cooperative equilibrium price. For 
this reason, the firms may try to coordinate their pricing decisions in order to jointly 
raise the price above the competitive level. However, a low product differentiation 
degree not only increases the opportunity for collusion, but it also increases the 
incentive to cheat from the collusive agreement. Indeed, with highly substitutable 
products, a cheating firm can capture a large fraction of the market and obtain large 
short-term profits by slightly lowering the price unilaterally. Therefore, the impact of 
the product differentiation degree on the sustainability of a collusive agreement is not a 
priori an obvious issue. 
The relationship between the product differentiation degree and the ability of the 
firms to collude has been studied by, among others, Chang (1991), Chang (1992) and 
Hackner (1995). Chang (1991) employs the spatial competition framework of Hotelling 
(1929) with quadratic transportation costs. He assumes fixed and symmetric locations of 
the firms. The sustainability of the cartel agreement is measured by the minimum 
discount factor supporting the joint maximum profits as a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
of an infinitely repeated game. Chang (1991) shows that collusion is easier to sustain 
the more differentiated are the firms. In fact, the critical discount factor monotonically 
increases as the product differentiation decreases. A similar result is found in Chang 
(1992), where the initial degree of differentiation is exogenous, but firms can relocate 
once the collusive agreement has been broken. Chang (1992) concludes that a higher 
initial product differentiation degree makes collusion easier to sustain. Hackner (1995) 
instead considers the possibility that firms collude not only with respect to the price but 
also with respect to the location. When the market discount factor is high enough, firms 
collude to locate at 1/4 and 3/4. The lower is the market discount factor the more the 
firms collude on a higher product differentiation degree in order to keep collusion from   3
breaking down. Hackner (1995) concludes that there is “a fairly general tendency within 
the Hotelling framework for differentiation to facilitate collusion” (pag. 293).  
All these articles are characterized by the assumption that firms cannot price 
discriminate. In this paper we remove this hypothesis, and we study how the product 
differentiation degree affects the sustainability of a collusive agreement when firms can 
perfectly price discriminate. At our knowledge, the only article that studies the 
sustainability of collusion taking into account price discrimination is Liu and Serfes 
(2007). They assume that firms are maximally differentiated on the Hotelling segment, 
while they allow for different customer-specific information quality (see also Liu and 
Serfes, 2004). Firms have access to information of a given quality which allows them to 
partition consumers into different groups and charge each group with a different price. 
Higher information quality is modelled as a refinement of the partition. At the limit, 
firms know the position of each consumer in the market and can charge each consumer 
with a different price (perfect price discrimination).  Liu and Serfes (2007) show that 
collusion becomes more difficult to sustain as the quality of consumer-specific 
information improves. Better information allows for higher collusive profits and harsher 
punishment, but at the same time makes deviation more profitable: this last effect 
dominates, and the critical discount factor is a positive function of the quality of 
information.  
On the one hand, our analysis is less general than Liu and Serfes (2007), since we 
consider only the case of perfect price discrimination
1. On the other hand, our analysis 
is more general, since we do not limit the analysis to the case of maximally 
differentiated firms, but we allow for different product differentiation degrees. As in Liu 
and Serfes (2007), we study three different collusive schemes: 1) collusion on 
discriminatory prices; 2) collusion on a uniform price; 3) collusion not to discriminate. 
In the first collusive scheme firms coordinate on the price to be applied to each 
consumer, without the constraint that the price must be equal for all consumers. Clearly, 
this collusive scheme yields the highest collusive profits, since it allows the colluding 
firms to perfectly target the price on the willingness to pay of each consumer. However, 
such collusive scheme may be very difficult to implement, since it requires negotiating 
on a huge number of prices (one for each consumer). A less “extreme” collusion is 
                                                 
1 In the appendix, however, we extend the analysis of two of the three collusive schemes we analyzed to 
the case of third-degree price discrimination.   4
represented by the second collusive scheme: here firms try to coordinate on a uniform 
price. This scheme is less profitable, but it is easier to implement, because it requires 
firms to agree only on one price. Finally, in the third collusive scheme firms do not 
agree directly on the price(s), but simply agree not to price discriminate. Since in the 
spatial competition framework price discrimination causes lower equilibrium profits
2, 
firms have the incentive to coordinate in order to compete less fiercely: an agreement 
not to discriminate has precisely this purpose
3.    
For each collusive scheme we search the minimum discount factor which is needed 
to sustain the joint maximum profits. We are mainly interested in the following 
question: how does the easiness of collusion change with the product differentiation 
degree? A linked question is the following: which collusive scheme is easier to sustain 
in equilibrium for any given product differentiation degree? We obtain the following 
results. The sustainability of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on 
the product differentiation degree. The sustainability of the second collusive scheme 
instead depends negatively on the product differentiation degree. This result contrasts 
with the findings by Chang (1991), Chang (1992) and Hackner (1995): the hypothesis 
of price discrimination reverses the relationship between the sustainability of collusion 
and the product differentiation degree. Moreover, in contrast with Chang (1991), the 
sustainability of collusion depends negatively on the transportation costs. We obtain 
also that, independently on the product differentiation degree, the first collusive scheme 
is easier to sustain than the second collusive scheme, which in turn is easier to sustain 
than the third collusive scheme. In addition, we consider the possibility that firms 
collude on a suboptimal discriminatory price schedule and on a suboptimal uniform 
price. In both cases we obtain that if optimal collusion is not sustainable, suboptimal 
collusion is not sustainable too. Finally, we extend in the appendix the analysis of the 
second and third collusive scheme to a third-degree price discrimination framework a la 
Liu and Serfes (2004, 2007), and we show that the results do not change.   
                                                 
2 See for example Thisse and Vives (1988). 
3 Each of the collusive schemes we study in this paper is well documented in European antitrust cases. 
Examples of the first collusive scheme are: Cast Iron and Steel (D. Comm., Oct. 17, 1983) and Pre-
insulated Pipes (D. Comm., Oct. 21, 1998); examples of the second collusive scheme are: Austrian Banks 
(D. Comm., June 12, 2002) and Specialty Graphite (D. Comm., Dec. 17, 2002); examples of the third 
collusive scheme are: IFTRA Glass (D. Comm., May 15, 1974), IFTRA Aluminium (D. Comm., July 15, 
1975) and Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement (FETTCSA) (D. Comm., May 16, 
2000).   5
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced. In section 3 
we describe the infinitely repeated game. In section 4 the sustainability of each collusive 
scheme is studied, while in section 5 the model is extended to include the possibility of 
suboptimal collusion. Section 6 summarizes. The appendix generalizes the second and 
the third collusive scheme results to the case of third-degree price discrimination.  
 
 
2. The model of differentiated firms 
 
Assume a linear market of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the 
market. Define with  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each consumer. Each point in the linear 
market represents a certain variety of a given good. For a consumer positioned at a 
certain point, the preferred variety is represented by the point in which the consumer is 
located: the more the variety is far from the point in which the consumer is located, the 
less it is appreciated by the consumer. Each consumer consumes no more than 1 unit of 
the good. Define with v the maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay for buying 
his preferred variety.  
There are two firms, A and B, competing in the market. Marginal costs are zero. 
Following Chang (1991), we consider symmetric firms. Firm A produces the variety 
] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ a  and firm B, given the symmetry assumption, produces the variety  a − 1 . The 
parameter a measures the product differentiation: when  0 = a , firms are maximally 
differentiated; when  2 1 = a  firms are identical. Finally, define with 
J
x p  the price 





x p p ' =  for every  ] 1 , 0 [ ' , ∈ x x . 
The utility of a consumer depends on v, on the price set by the firm from which he 
buys, and on the distance between his preferred variety and the variety produced by the 
firm. Following D’Aspremont et al. (1979), we assume quadratic transportation costs. 
Define with t, equal for all consumers, the importance attributed by the consumer to the 
distance between his preferred variety and the variety offered by the firm. The utility of 
a consumer located at x when he buys from firm A is given by: 




x − − − = , 
while the utility of a consumer located at x when he buys from firm B is given by:   6




x + − − − = . As in Chang (1991), Chang (1992) and Hackner (1995) we 
assume 4 5 ≥ ≡ t v w : this assumption is sufficient to guarantee that under any optimal 
collusive agreement the entire market is served.  
 
 
3. The infinitely repeated game 
 
Suppose that firms interact repeatedly in an infinite horizon setting. As in Chang 
(1991), Chang (1992) and Hackner (1995), a grim strategy is assumed (Friedman, 
1971)
4. Moreover, there is perfect monitoring. Define 
C Π , 
D Π  and 
N Π  respectively as 
the one-shot collusive profits, the one-shot deviation profits and the one-shot 
punishment (or Nash) profits for each firm: obviously, 
N C D Π > Π > Π . Define δ  as the 
market discount factor, which is assumed to be exogenous and common for each firm. It 
is well known that collusion is sustainable as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium if 
and only if the discounted value of the profits that each firm obtains under collusion 
exceeds the discounted value of the profits that each firm obtains deviating from the 












C t δ δ , 
 
After some manipulations, the incentive-compatibility constraint can be rewritten as 
follows: 
 





∗ δ δ                                                   (1) 
                                                 
4 The grim strategy implies that firms start by charging the collusive price schedule, 
C p . The firms 
continue to set 
C p  until one firm has played 
D p  in the previous period, where 
D p  is the price schedule 
set by a firm which deviates from the collusive agreement. If a firm sets 
D p  at time t, from  1 + t  onward 
both firms play 
N p , where 
N p  is the equilibrium price schedule emerging in the non-cooperative 
constituent game (Nash price).   7
 
Define 
∗ δ  as the critical discount factor. Equation (1) says that if the market discount 
factor is greater than the critical discount factor collusion is sustainable, otherwise it is 
not sustainable. Then, the critical discount factor measures the sustainability of the 
agreement: the greater is 




4. Sustainability of the collusive schemes 
 
The stage game 
 
Given the varieties produced by the firms and given the price set by each of them, 
each consumer buys from the firm which gives him the higher utility. If the utility of a 
consumer is the same when he buys from firm A and when he buys from firm B, we 
assume that he buys from the nearer firm
5. The following proposition defines the Nash 
prices for any a: 
 
Proposition 1: when the firms can perfectly price discriminate between the consumers, 
the equilibrium prices during the punishment stage are the following: 
 
                     
⎩
⎨
⎧ + − −
=
0
) 4 2 2 1 ( , ax a x t
p







                                 (2) 




+ − − −
=
) 4 2 2 1 (
0 ,
ax a x t
p







                                 (3) 
 
Proof. Suppose  2 1 < x . Consider firm B. First, we show that  0 >
B
x p  cannot be an 
equilibrium price. When  0 >
B
x p , the highest price firm A can set in order to serve 




x + − − + = . But now firm B  has convenience to 
                                                 
5 This assumption is very common in spatial models, since it allows avoiding the technicality of ε-
equilibria. For more details about this assumption, see among the others Hurter and Lederer (1985), 
Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse and Vives (1988), Hamilton et al. (1989), Hamilton and Thisse (1992).    8
undercut 
A
x p  in order to serve consumer x. Therefore  0 >
B
x p  cannot be an equilibrium 
price. Second, we show that  0 =
B
x p  is an equilibrium price. When  0 =
B
x p , the highest 
price firm A can set in order to serve consumer x is: ) 4 2 2 1 ( ax a x t p
A
x + − − = . With 
such a price firm B obtains zero profits from consumer x, which buys from firm A, but it 
has no incentive to change its price, because increasing the price it would continue to 
obtain zero profits, and setting a price lower than the marginal costs would entail a loss. 
On the other hand, firm A is setting the highest possible price which guarantees it to 
serve consumer x: therefore, it has no incentive to change its price. It follows that 
) 4 2 2 1 ( ax a x t p
A
x + − − =  and  0 =
B
x p  represents the (unique) price equilibrium. The 
proof for  2 1 > x  is symmetric. Finally, when  2 1 = x , the standard Bertrand’s result 
holds: the unique price equilibrium when two undifferentiated firms compete on price is 
represented by both firms setting a price equal to the marginal cost.                               ■                             
 
The punishment profits of each firm follow directly from Proposition 1: 
 
                                                    ) 2 1 (
4
a
t N − = Π                                                            (4) 
 
Optimal collusion on discriminatory prices 
 
Consider the first collusive scheme. Define  * p  as the optimal collusive 
discriminatory price schedule. Since the individual price can be perfectly targeted to 
each consumer, the optimal collusive price is the highest price which satisfies the 
participation constraint of the consumer. Therefore:   
 





≥ + − −
≤ − −
=
2 1 ) 1 (




x if a x t v
x if a x t v
p                                  (5) 
 
Given the assumption on w, * p  is strictly positive for any a and x and the whole 
market is served. It is immediate to note that consumers located at  ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  buy from   9
firm A, while consumers located at  ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ x  buy from firm B. Consumer surplus is 
totally transferred to the firms, and the collusive profits of each firm are equal to:    
 






2 + − − = Π
a
a
t v C                                                  (6) 
 
Suppose that firm A deviates from the collusive agreement. Define with  1 ˆ p  the price 
that makes the consumer located in x indifferent between buying from firm A and from 




x =  with respect 
to  1 ˆ p  we get:  ) 4 2 2 1 ( * ˆ1 ax a x t p p + − − + = . We assume that when the consumer is 
indifferent between the deviating firm and the colluding firm, he buys from the 
deviating firm
6. Therefore  1 ˆ p  is the highest price which allows firm A to steal a 
consumer from firm B.  However, firm A may be impeded from setting  1 ˆ p : this occurs 
when  1 ˆ p  is too high for the participation constraint of the consumer or when it is too 
low for the participation constraint of the firm. Since p* extracts the whole consumer 
surplus, it represents a natural upper bound for the deviation price, while the marginal 
cost (equal to zero) is the lower bound for the deviation price. Then: 
 
                                            { } ] ˆ *; min[ ; 0 max 1 p p p
D = ,                                              (7) 
 
where 
D p  is the deviation price schedule. The following lemma fully characterizes the 
deviation price schedule:  
 
Lemma 1. When firms collude on * p  the deviation price schedule is: 
 
                                                  
2 ) ( a x t v p
D − − =                                                      (8) 
 
                                                 
6 This assumption can be rationalized noting that the deviating firm can always offer to the consumer a 
utility which is strictly larger than the utility he receives from the colluding firm by setting a price equal 
to  ε − 1 ˆ p , where ε  is a positive small number.    10
Proof. First, consider the consumers located at  2 1 ≤ x . Since  0 ) 4 2 2 1 ( ≥ + − − ax a x t  
2 1 ≤ ∀x , it follows that  * ˆ1 p p ≥  (i.e. the participation constraint of the consumer 
binds). Moreover, given the assumption on w,  0 *≥ p  (i.e. the participation constraint of 
the deviating firm does not bind). Then, by equation (7), it must be:  * p p
D = . Finally, 
using equation (5) it follows that: 
2 ) ( a x t v p
D − − = , 2 1 ≤ ∀x . Next, consider the 
consumers located at  2 1 ≥ x . Since  0 ) 4 2 2 1 ( ≤ + − − ax a x t   2 1 ≥ ∀x , it follows that 
* ˆ1 p p ≤  (i.e. the participation constraint of the consumer does not bind). Moreover, 
given the assumption on w,  0 ˆ1 ≥ p  for  2 1 ≥ x  (i.e. the participation constraint of the 
firm does not bind). By equation (7) it must be:  1 ˆ p p
D = . Substituting equation (5) into 
1 ˆ p  we get: 
2 ) ( a x t v p
D − − = ,  2 1 ≥ ∀x .                                                                          ■                       
 
The deviation profits are the following: 
 
                                               ta ta
t
v
D + − − = Π
2
3
                                                   (9) 
 
By substituting equations (4), (6) and (9) into equation (1) we obtain the critical 
discount factor: 
 




∗ δ                                                               (10) 
 
Then, the sustainability of the optimal collusive discriminatory price schedule does 
not depend on the product differentiation degree. The fact that the substitutability of the 
products of the two firms is high or low does not have any impact on the likelihood that 
the tacit agreement will be disrupted by the defection of one member of the cartel. 
When firms can perfectly price discriminate during the deviation and the punishment 
phase, collusion can be sustained if and only the market discount factor exceeds 1/2, 
irrespectively of the position of the firms in the market. 
 
   11
Optimal collusion on uniform price 
 
Suppose now that the firms, instead of colluding on the optimal discriminatory price 
schedule, collude on the optimal uniform price, 
C
p . Chang (1991) and Hackner (1995) 
show that, under the hypothesis that  4 5 ≥ w , joint profit maximization implies full 
market coverage. Therefore, profits are maximized by raising the price until the farthest 
consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying. It follows that when  4 1 ≤ a  the 
consumer located in the middle of the segment ( 2 1 = x ) receives zero utility at the 
profit maximizing collusive uniform price. Similarly, when  4 1 ≥ a , the consumers at 
the endpoints of the segment ( 0 = x  and  1 = x ) receive zero utility at the profit 
maximizing collusive uniform price. Hence, the optimal collusive uniform price is given 
by: 
 














   
if
if







                                         (11) 
 
At this point it is convenient to handle separately the case of  4 1 ≤ a  and the case of 
4 1 ≥ a . The relevant equations will be identified by the appropriate subscript. We start 
from the case in which the firms are highly differentiated,  4 1 ≤ a . The collusive profits 
of each firm are the following: 
 









a − − = Π ≤                                                   (12) 
 
Suppose that firm A deviates. Define  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≤ a p  as the price that makes the consumer 
located in x indifferent between buying from firm A and from firm B, which is setting 
the collusive price 




x p u p u = ≤  with respect to  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≤ a p  we get: 
) 4 2 2 1 ( ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ax a x t p p
C
a + − − + = ≤ . Following the reasoning introduced in the previous   12
subsection, the deviation price is equal to  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≤ a p , provided that  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≤ a p  is lower than  p* 
and higher than 0. That is: 
 
                                       { } ] ˆ *; min[ ; 0 max 4 1 ; 2 4 1 ≤ ≤ = a
D
a p p p                                          (13) 
 
The following lemma describes the deviation price schedule: 
 
Lemma 2. Suppose  4 1 ≤ a . When firms collude on 
C
p  the deviation price schedule is: 
 





4 1 x a a ax t v p
D
a + + + − − − = ≤                                        (14) 
 
Proof. First, we show that:  * ˆ 4 1 ; 2 p p a ≤ ≤ . The utility of each consumer (except the 
farthest one) paying 
C
p  has to be positive, since 
C
p  is obtained by setting the utility of 
the farthest consumer equal to zero. Therefore,  0 ) ( ≥
C A
x p u . Given the indifference 
condition, it follows that  0 ) ˆ ( 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≤ a
A
x p u . Recall that the optimal discriminatory price 
schedule yields zero consumer surplus, that is:  0 *) ( = p u
A
x . Therefore: 




x ≥ ≤ , which in turn implies  * ˆ 4 1 ; 2 p p a ≤ ≤ . Next, we prove that 
0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≤ a p . Using equation (11) in  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≤ a p   we obtain the following equation: 
) 2 4 3 4 ( ˆ
2
4 1 ; 2 x a a ax t v p a + + + − − − = ≤ . After some manipulations, the condition 
0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≤ a p  can be rewritten as:  x a a ax w 2 4 3 4
2 + + + − − > . Since  4 5 ≥ w , the 
condition is always verified when:  ) 4 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 x a a x − + > − . Both the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. 
of the last inequality are linearly decreasing in x. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider 
the extreme values of x: when  0 = x  we get  ) 1 ( 2 a a + > , and when  1 = x  we get 
) 3 ( 0 − > a a . Hence, the l.h.s. is always larger than the r.h.s.. It follows that  0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≤ a p  
x ∀ . Therefore, by equation (13),  = = ≤ ≤ 4 1 ; 2 4 1 ˆ a
D
a p p ) 2 4 3 4 (
2 x a a ax t v + + + − − − .       ■                             
   13
Given the deviation price schedule, all consumers are served by the deviating firm, and 
the deviation profits are: 
 





( ) ( a t v a
D
a − − = Π ≤                                               (15) 
 
By inserting equations (4), (12) and (15) into equation (1) we obtain the critical 
discount factor: 
 























≤ δ                                             (16) 
 
Consider now the case of lower product differentiation degree,  4 1 ≥ a . The collusive 
profits are: 
 
                                            
2





a − = Π ≥                                                       (17) 
 
Suppose firm A  cheats. As usual, define  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≥ a p  as the price which solves 




x p u p u = ≥ . Therefore:  ) 4 2 2 1 ( ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ax a x t p p
C
a + − − + = ≥ , which is the 
deviation price schedule provided that it is lower than  p* and higher than 0.  Then: 
 
                                      { } ] ˆ *; min[ ; 0 max 4 1 ; 2 4 1 ≥ ≥ = a
D
a p p p                                           (18) 
 
The deviation price schedule is fully characterized by the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 3. Suppose  4 1 ≥ a . When firms collude on 
C
p  the deviation price schedule is: 
 
                                     ) 2 2 1 4 (
2
4 1 a x ax a t v p
D
a + + − − − = ≥                                      (19) 
    14
Proof. The proof for  * ˆ 4 1 ; 2 p p a ≤ ≥  is identical to the case described in Lemma 2. We 
prove now that:  0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≥ a p . By substituting equation (11) into  4 1 ; 2 ˆ ≥ a p , we obtain: 
) 2 2 1 4 ( ˆ
2
4 1 ; 2 a x ax a t v p a + + − − − = ≥ . Rearranging, the condition  0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≥ a p  can be 
rewritten as:  a x ax a w 2 2 1 4
2 + + − − > . Since  4 5 ≥ w , the condition is always verified 
when:  ) 2 4 ( 2 4 9 + − > − x a a x . Both the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. of the last inequality are 
linearly decreasing in x. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the extreme values of x: 
when  0 = x  we get  ) 2 ( 4 9 + > a a , and when  1 = x  we get  ) 2 ( 4 1 − > a a . Hence, the 
l.h.s. is always larger than the r.h.s.. It follows that  0 ˆ 4 1 ; 2 ≥ ≥ a p  for any x and 
2 1 4 1 ≤ ≤ a . Therefore, by equation (18),  ) 2 2 1 4 ( ˆ
2
4 1 ; 2 4 1 a x ax a t v p p a
D
a + + − − − = = ≥ ≥ . 
■                                                                                                                           
 
Therefore, the deviating firm serves the whole market and the deviation profits are: 
 
                                               
2
4 1 ) ( ta v a
D
a − = Π ≥                                                       (20) 
 
By inserting equations (4), (17) and (20) into (1), we obtain the critical discount 
factor:  
 



































4 1 ) , (





a if w a






δ                                 (22)      
     
We state the following proposition: 
   15
Proposition 2: ) , ( 2 w a
∗ δ  
a)  is a continuous function; 
b)  is monotonically decreasing both in a and w; 
c)  takes values between 1/2 and ) (w g,  w h e r e ] 3 2 ; 2 1 [ ) ( ∈ w g and 0 (.) < ∂ ∂ w g .  
 
Proof. 
a) In order to prove that  ) , ( 2 w a
∗ δ is a function we need to verify that it takes a unique 
value for all points of its domain. This is certainly true when  ) 4 1 , 0 [ ∈ a  and 
] 2 1 , 4 1 ( ∈ a . It remains to verify it when  4 1 = a . Hence, we need to prove that 




≤ δ δ . By substituting  4 1 = a  in equations (16) and 
(21), we get:  ) ; 4 1 (
8 3 2
16 1
) ; 4 1 ( 4 1 4 1 w a
w
w







≤ δ δ . Moreover, since 
) , ( 4 1 w a a
∗
≤ δ  and  ) , ( 4 1 w a a
∗




≤ δ δ  
implies that  ) , ( 2 w a
∗ δ  is continuous in  ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ a  and  ) , 4 5 [ ∞ ∈ w .  
b) Consider the derivative of 
∗
2 δ   with respect to w. When  4 1 ≤ a  we obtain:   
0 ] ) 2 2 3 1 ( 2 [ ) 1 2 (
2 2
4 1 ≤ − + − − = ∂ ∂
∗
≤ w a a a w a δ , while when  4 1 ≥ a  we obtain: 
0 ) 4 4 2 1 ( ) 2 4 (
2 2
4 1 ≤ − + − − = ∂ ∂
∗
≥ w a a a w a δ . Therefore 
∗
2 δ  decreases as w increases. 
Consider now the derivative of 
∗
2 δ  with respect to a. When  4 1 ≤ a  we get: 
0 ) 2 2 3 1 ( 4 ] ) 2 1 ( 4 [
2 2 2
4 1 < − + − − + − = ∂ ∂
∗
≤ w a a a w a a δ . When  4 1 ≥ a  we obtain: 
2 2 2
4 1 ) 4 4 2 1 ( ) ( 4 w a a a a w a a − + − + − − = ∂ ∂
∗
≥ δ . The derivative is negative if and only 
if 
2 a a w − > , which is always true since the maximum value of the r.h.s. is 1/4. 
c) Since  ) , ( 2 w a
∗ δ  is decreasing both in a and in w, its maximum is in  ) 4 5 ; 0 ( = = w a . 
It results:  3 2 ) 4 5 ; 0 ( 2 = = =
∗ w a δ . On the contrary, the critical discount factor takes 
the minimum value when  2 1 = a  and  ∞ → w . Note that  2 1 ) , 2 1 ( 2 = =
∗ w a δ  for any 








for any a.                                                                                                                           ■ 
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Proposition 2 shows that there is a negative relationship between the product 
differentiation degree and the sustainability of the collusive agreement, as well as a 
negative relationship between the transportation costs and the sustainability of the 
collusive agreement. These findings contrast with Chang (1991) model, where a positive 
relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of the 
collusive agreement as well as a positive relationship between the transportation costs 
and the sustainability of the collusive agreement are shown to exist. In the following, 
we try to describe the mechanism behind such reversion. First, note that the sign of the 
derivative of the critical discount factor depends on the value taken by the following 
function, which is simply the numerator of the derivative of the critical discount factor 
(equation (1)) with respect to the variable i:  
 











+ Π − Π
∂
Π ∂
− Π − Π
∂
Π ∂
= Γ , 
 
where  a t i , = . That is, when  0 > Γ  the derivative of the critical discount factor is 
positive, and vice-versa.  
From equations (4), (15) and (20) of this paper and equations (6), (9) and (10) in 
Hackner (1995)








u Π < Π , where the 
subscript indicates the uniform price model (Chang, 1991, Hackner, 1995) and the 
discriminatory price model (our paper) respectively, while the superscript indicates the 
Nash profits and the deviation profits respectively. The explanation is the following. 
When a firm can use discriminatory deviation prices, it can better target the prices it 
uses to steal consumers from the rival, and therefore deviation profits are larger. On the 
contrary, when both firms compete with discriminatory prices, competition is fiercer, 
and consequently Nash profits are lower. 
Consider now  t i = . By comparing the derivatives of equations (4), (15) and (20) of this 
chapter with the derivatives of equations (6), (9) and (10) in Hackner (1995) we get: 
                                                 
7 Hackner (1995) defines the relevant equations for the model with uniform price, while in Chang (1991) 
they are left implicit. So we refer directly to Hackner’s paper. Moreover, in order to simplify the 
exposition, we refer only to the case where the deviating firm serves the whole market: a sufficient 





















u . The intuition behind the first inequality is the 
following. When transportation costs increase, each consumer is more “loyal” to the 
nearer firm. Therefore, it becomes more difficult for the cheating firm to steal 
consumers from the rival. When the cheating firm uses a uniform price, the deviation 
price reduces for all consumers as a consequence of a larger t. Instead, when the 
deviating firm uses discriminatory prices, a larger t allows increasing prices on those 
consumers which are nearer to the cheating firm
8. This effect partially counterbalances 
the reduction of the prices applied on the more distant consumers, and therefore the 
deviation profits are less sensitive (in absolute value) to variations in t in the 
discriminatory price model. The intuition behind the second inequality is the following. 
The equilibrium Nash price in the uniform price model is given by
9: ) 2 1 ( a t − , while the 
equilibrium Nash prices in the discriminatory price model are given by
10: 
) 4 2 2 1 ( ax x a t + − − . With discriminatory prices, the individual price does not depend 
only on the transportation costs and on the distance between the firms as in the uniform 
price model, but also on the location of the consumer, x. In particular, the more the 
consumer is indifferent between the firms, the less the price depends on t: at the limit, 
when the consumer is completely indifferent between the firms ( 2 1 = x ), the 
equilibrium price is 0 for every t  (i.e. transportation costs do not matter for the 
equilibrium price on this consumer). In general, the dependency of the equilibrium 
discriminatory prices on x reduces the dependency of equilibrium discriminatory prices 
on t: therefore the Nash profits in the discriminatory price model are less sensitive to t 
with respect to the uniform price model.   
Finally, from equations (12) and (17)





. In fact, the 
greater is t the smaller is the collusive price needed to serve the furthest consumer.  
                                                 
8 Consider the derivative of equations (14) and (19) of this paper with respect to t and observe that they 
are positive for low values of x. 
9 See, for example, D’Aspremont et al., (1979). 
10 See Proposition 1. Here we consider only consumers located in the first half of the segment. The 
analysis proceeds in the same way for the other consumers. 
11 Equations (12) and (17) of this paper coincide with equations (4) and (5) in Hackner (1995) paper 
respectively.   18
Now, it is possible to identify the impact of the discriminatory price assumption over 
the Γ-function. Ceteris paribus, the fact that the derivative of the deviation profits is 
smaller (in absolute value) in the discriminatory price model increases Γ with respect to 
the uniform price model; the fact that the derivative of the Nash profits is smaller in the 
discriminatory price model decreases Γ with respect to the uniform price model; the 
fact that the deviation profits are greater in the discriminatory price model increases Γ 
with respect to the uniform price model; and, finally, the fact that the Nash profits are 
smaller in the discriminatory price model decreases Γ with respect to the uniform price 
model
12. In our framework, the lower sensitivity of the deviation profits and the higher 
level of the deviation profits in the discriminatory price model outweigh the impact of 
the lower sensitivity and the lower level of the Nash profits, and change the sign of Γ: 
the relationship between the transportation costs and the critical discount factor thus 
reverses with respect to the uniform price model.  
 
Consider now  a i = , with  4 1 ≤ a . Again, from equations (4) and (15) of this paper and 



























ceteris paribus, the fact that the derivative of the deviation profits is smaller in the 
discriminatory price model decreases Γ with respect to the uniform price model; the 
fact that the derivative of the Nash profits is smaller (in absolute value) in the 
discriminatory price model increases Γ with respect to the uniform price model; the 
fact that the deviation profits are greater in the discriminatory price model decreases Γ 
with respect to the uniform price model; and, finally, the fact that the Nash profits are 
smaller in the discriminatory price model increases Γ with respect to the uniform price 
                                                 
12 From equations (12) and (15) of this paper, we get:  0 ) 2 1 ( 2 1







for  4 1 ≤ a ; from equations (17) and (20), we get:  0 2






d  for 
4 1 ≥ a . 
13 The sign of the derivatives with respect to a is the opposite of the sign of the derivatives with respect to 
t. The intuition behind the lower (absolute) value of the derivatives in the discriminatory price model is 
analogous to the explanation developed for the transportation costs, once one takes into account the 
reversion of the sign of the derivatives. 
14 Indeed, when firms move from the endpoints of the segment to 1/4 and 3/4 the furthest consumers 
become nearer.     19
model
15. Again, the lower sensitivity of the deviation profits and the higher level of the 
deviation profits in the discriminatory price model outweigh the impact of the lower 
sensitivity and the lower level of the Nash profits, and change the sign of Γ: the higher 
is the product differentiation degree, the higher is the critical discount factor, while the 
opposite is true in the uniform price model.  
Finally, consider  a i = , with  4 1 ≥ a . Now, from equations (4), (17) and (20) of this 
paper and equations (6) and (10) in Hackner (1995) paper we obtain the following 

























16. Then, ceteris 
paribus, the fact that the derivative of the deviation profits in the discriminatory price 
model is negative instead of positive decreases Γ with respect to the uniform price 
model; the fact that the derivative of the Nash profits is smaller (in absolute value) in 
the discriminatory price model increases Γ with respect to the uniform price model; the 
fact that the deviation profits are greater in the discriminatory price model decreases Γ 
with respect to the uniform price model
17; and, finally, the fact that the Nash profits are 
smaller in the discriminatory price model decreases Γ with respect to the uniform price 
model
18. The reversion of the sign of the derivative of the deviation profits together with 
the higher level of the deviation profits and the lower level of the Nash profits in the 
discriminatory price model outweigh the impact of the lower sensitivity of the Nash 
profits, and change the sign of Γ: the relationship between the product differentiation 
degree and the critical discount factor is therefore reverted with respect to the uniform 
price model. 
 
                                                 











u  is analogous to the intuition developed for t, when one 
takes into account the reversion of the sign of the derivatives.  0 < ∂ Π ∂ a
C  is due to the fact that when 
firms move from 1/4 and 3/4 to the middle of the segment, the furthest consumers (located at the 
endpoints of the segment) become more distant. With regard to  0 > ∂ Π ∂ a
D
u  and  0 < ∂ Π ∂ a
D
d , Chang 
(1991, pag. 464) notices that when  4 1 ≥ a  a lower product differentiation degree has two opposite 
effects on the deviation profits. First, for a given collusive price, a lower product differentiation degree 
allows for a higher deviation price, which in turn induces greater deviation profits; second, the collusive 
price is lower when firms are nearer, and this reduces the deviation profits. In the uniform price model the 
first effect prevails, and therefore the deviation profits increase with a; in the discriminatory price model 
the second effect dominates, and therefore the deviation profits decrease with a.  




d .  
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Collusion not to discriminate 
 
In the third collusive scheme the firms do not jointly fix the price schedules. Instead, 
they agree not to price discriminate. Once firms have established to set a uniform price 
to all consumers, competition determines which price is effectively applied by the firms. 
Define with 
C p (  the uniform price which results from the competition between the 
firms, when firms have collusively decided not to price discriminate. It is well known 
that the equilibrium uniform price and the equilibrium profits are respectively 
(D’Aspremont et al., 1979):  
 
                                                      ) 2 1 ( a t p
C − = (                                                       (23) 
    
                                                     ) 2 1 (
2
a
t C − = Π
(
                                                    (24) 
 
A straightforward implication of equation (23) is that when  2 1 = a  collusive profits 
are nil and equal to the punishment profits. We simplify the analysis making the 
reasonable assumption that in this case firms have no incentive to collude. Therefore, 
the rest of the analysis is limited to the case of  2 1 < a .  
 




x p u p u ( = . 
Therefore:  ) 4 2 2 1 ( ˆ3 ax a x t p p
C + − − + = ( . Then: 
 
                                              { } ] ˆ *; min[ ; 0 max 3 p p p
D = (                                            (25) 
 
The deviation price schedule is fully characterized by the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 4. When firms collude not to discriminate, the deviation price schedule is: 
 
                                                ) 4 2 4 2 ( ax x a t p
D + − − = (                                           (26) 
   21
Proof. The proof for  * ˆ3 p p ≤  is identical to the case described in Lemma 2. We prove 
that: 0 ˆ3 ≥ p . Substituting equation (23) into  3 ˆ p , we obtain:  ) 4 4 2 2 ( ˆ3 ax a x t p + − − = . 
Note that  3 ˆ p  is continuous and strictly decreasing in x. Therefore,  3 ˆ p  is positive for 
every x if and only if it is non-negative when  1 = x . Since  0 ) 1 ( ˆ3 = = x p ,  3 ˆ p  is strictly 
positive for every  1 < x . Hence,  ) 4 4 2 2 ( ˆ3 ax a x t p p
D + − − = = (                                      ■                             
 
Therefore, the cheating firm serves the whole market and the deviation profits are: 
 
                                                         ) 2 1 ( a t
D − = Π
(
                                                 (27) 
  
During the punishment phase the firms compete fiercely. The equilibrium price 
schedules are defined by equations (2) and (3), while the punishment profits are defined 
by equation (4). Therefore, the critical discount factor is obtained inserting equations 
(4), (24) and (27) into equation (1). It follows: 
 




∗ δ                                                         (28) 
 
As for the first collusive scheme, the product differentiation degree does not 
influence the sustainability of the collusive agreement, since the critical discount factor 
is equal to 2/3 for every value of a. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the results. The critical discount factor of the first and the third 
collusive scheme does not depend on the position of the firms in the market. Instead, the 
critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme decreases when the product 
differentiation degree decreases. Moreover, the critical discount factor of the second 
scheme is always between the critical discount factor of the first scheme (1/2) and the 
critical discount factor of the third scheme (2/3). This implies that the first collusive 
agreement is always easier to sustain than the second collusive agreement, which in turn 
is always easier to sustain than the third collusive agreement. Compare now the 
collusive profits in the three collusive schemes (equations (6), (12), (17) and (24)).   22
Obviously, the first collusive scheme yields the largest collusive profits, while the third 
collusive scheme yields the smallest collusive profits. The collusive profits under the 
second collusive scheme are in an intermediate position. Therefore, the first collusive 
scheme dominates the other two collusive schemes: it yields greater profits and it is 
easier to sustain. However, this does not imply that collusion on a uniform price or 
collusion not to discriminate will never arise. Even if these schemes are less profitable 
and more difficult to sustain, they may be less “costly” to implement than the collusion 
on discriminatory prices, since an agreement regarding a huge number of prices (as the 
first collusive scheme) may be very time-demanding and difficult to reach. 






5. Suboptimal collusion 
 
In the previous section we considered the sustainability of optimal collusion. Now 
we ask whether suboptimal collusion is sustainable when optimal collusion is not 
sustainable. In the following we show that suboptimal collusion is never sustainable 
when optimal collusion is not sustainable
19.  
                                                 
19 Notice that the answer cannot be known a priori if the suboptimal collusive price is lower than the 
optimal collusive price: both the collusive profits and the deviation profits are lower and the net effect on   23
 
Suboptimal collusion on discriminatory prices 
 
Consider the following setting. The two firms collude on the prices to set to the 
consumers located at points  ' x  and  ' 1 x − , with  2 1 '< x . Suppose first that the firms 
collude in the optimal way, that is, they set the collusive prices  ) ' ( * ) ' ( x p x p
C =  and 
) ' 1 ( * ) ' 1 ( x p x p
C − = − , respectively on consumer  ' x  and consumer  ' 1 x − . Of course, 
) ' 1 ( * ) ' ( * x p x p − = . The collusive profits each firm obtains from these consumers are:  
 
                                            ) ' ( * ) ' 1 ; ' ( x p x x
C = − Π                                                   (29) 
 
Define:  ) ' 4 2 ' 2 1 ( ) ' ( ax a x t x T + − − ≡ . Note that:  0 ) ' ( ≥ x T  if  2 1 ≤ x  and  0 ) ' ( ≤ x T  if 
2 1 ≥ x
20. Moreover, note that:  ) ' 1 ( ) ' ( x T x T − − = .  
Consider the punishment profits. From equations (2) and (3) we can write: 
 
                                             ) ' ( ) ' 1 ; ' ( x T x x
N = − Π                                                     (30) 
 
Suppose that firm A deviates. Using Lemma 1 we get:  
 





D − = ≡ −                                    (31) 
 
It follows that the deviation profits firm A obtains from consumers  ' x  and  ' 1 x −  are:  
 
                                    ) ' ( ) ' ( * 2 ) ' 1 ; ' ( x T x p x x
D − = − Π                                             (32) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
the critical discount factor is a priori ambiguous. On the contrary, the answer is a priori negative if the 
suboptimal collusive price is higher than the optimal collusive price, since collusive profits are lower and 
the deviation profits are higher. Therefore, in the remaining part of this section we refer only to 
suboptimal collusive prices which are lower than the optimal collusive price.     
20 Indeed, 
2 2 ) ' ( ) ' 1 ( ) ' 4 2 ' 2 1 ( ) ' ( a x t a x t ax a x t x T − − − − = + − − ≡  measures the advantage (disadvantage) of 
firm A over firm B in serving consumer  2 1 '≤ x  ( 2 1 ≥ ), because it says how much firm A may increase 
(decrease) its price above (below) the price set by the rival without loosing (serving) consumer ' x .   24
Now, observe that: 
 
)] ' 1 ; ' ( ) ' 1 ; ' ( [ 2 )] ' ( ) ' ( * [ 2 ) ' 1 ; ' ( ) ' 1 ; ' ( x x x x x T x p x x x x
C D N D − Π − − Π = − = − Π − − Π      (33)       
 
Obviously, if optimal collusion regards not only consumers  ' x  and  ' 1 x −  but also, 
say, consumers  " x  and  " 1 x − ,  ' ' ' x  and  ' ' ' 1 x − , and so on, the previous result does not 
change: the difference between the deviation profits and the Nash profits is always 
equal to the double of the difference between the deviation profits and the collusive 
profits. Define W as the set of consumers served with optimal collusive discriminatory 
prices. From (33) it follows that: 
 
     Ω = − Π − − Π = − Π − − Π = ∑ ∑
∈ ∈




N D x x x x x x x x Z         (34) 
                   
Suppose now that the two firms set suboptimal collusive prices on the consumers 
located at x ~ and  x ~ 1− , with  2 1 ~ ≤ x . Suboptimal collusive prices are defined as the 
optimal collusive prices minus a strictly positive amount. That is:  k x p x p
C − = ) ~ ( * ) ~ ( 
and  k x p x p
C − − = − ) ~ 1 ( * ) ~ 1 ( , respectively for consumer  x ~ and consumer  x ~ 1− , with 
0 > k . The collusive profits each firm obtains from consumers  x ~ and  x ~ 1−  are:  
 
                                             k x p x x
C − = − Π ) ~ ( * ) ~ 1 ; ~ (                                               (35) 
 
The punishment profits are: 
 
                                                 ) ~ ( ) ~ 1 ; ~ ( x T x x
N = − Π                                                   (36) 
 
Suppose that firm A deviates from the collusive agreement. Define  S p ˆ  as the price 




x − = , with  x x x ~ 1 , ~ − = . It is:  ) ( ) ( * ˆ x T k x p pS + − = , with 
x x x ~ 1 , ~ − = . Then: 
 
                         {} )] ( ) ( * ); ( * min[ ; 0 max x T k x p x p p
D
S + − =  ,   x x x ~ 1 , ~ − =               (37)   25
 






S p p p − ≡ , that is, the deviation prices applied by firm A on 
consumer  x ~ and consumer  x ~ 1−  respectively. First, note that  0 ~ =
D
x p  is impossible for 
every k. In fact, for it to be possible, it must be:  )] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ); ~ ( * min[ 0 x T k x p x p + − > . But 
) ~ ( * 0 x p >  is clearly impossible, and  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0 x T k x p + − >  is impossible as well, since 
it contradicts the assumption that the collusive profits must be higher than the 
punishment profits
21. Second, note that  ) ~ ( * ~ 1 x p p
D
x = −  is impossible for every k, since it 
would imply:  )] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ); ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( * x T k x p x p x p − − = .   
 
Assume for the moment  2 1 < a . Depending on the value of k, four cases are 
possible: 
 
Case 1)  ] 0 ); ~ ( * [ x p p
D
S = . It occurs if and only if the following conditions hold: 
 




− − = − − >
+ − = <
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( * 0
x T k x p x p x T k x p
x T k x p x p x p




                             
Case 2)  )] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ); ~ ( * [ x T k x p x p p
D
S − − = . It occurs if and only if the following 
conditions hold: 
 




− − = − − <
+ − = <
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( * 0
x T k x p x p x T k x p
x T k x p x p x p




                
Case 3)  )] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ); ~ ( ) ~ ( * [ x T k x p x T k x p p
D
S − − + − = . It occurs if and only if the 
following conditions hold: 
 




− − = − − <
+ − = + − <
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
x T k x p x p x T k x p
x T k x p x p x T k x p




           
                                                 
21 Indeed, 
N C Π > Π  implies:  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * x T k x p > − , which is impossible if  0 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * < + − x T k x p .   26
Case 4)  ] 0 ); ~ ( ) ~ ( * [ x T k x p p
D
S + − = . It occurs if and only if the following conditions 
hold: 
   




− − = − − >
+ − = + − <
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
)] ~ ( ) ~ ( * ), ~ ( * min[ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 0
x T k x p x p x T k x p
x T k x p x p x T k x p





Clearly, the deviation profits firm A obtains from consumers  x ~ and  x ~ 1−  depend on the 
deviation prices. Therefore: 
 
Case 1)  ) ~ ( * ) ~ 1 ; ~ ( x p x x
D = − Π                                                                                       (46)                         
Case 2)  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * 2 ) ~ 1 ; ~ ( x T k x p x x
D − − = − Π                                                                     (47) 
Case 3)  k x p x x
D 2 ) ~ ( * 2 ) ~ 1 ; ~ ( − = − Π                                                                              (48) 
Case 4)  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * ) ~ 1 ; ~ ( x T k x p x x
D + − = − Π                                                                       (49) 
 
We state the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 5: the following inequalities hold: 
 
Case 1)  (.)] (.) [ 2 2 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * (.) (.)
C D N D k x T x p Π − Π = < − = Π − Π                                   (50) 
Case 2)  (.)] (.) [ 2 )) ~ ( ) ~ ( * ( 2 ) ~ ( 2 ) ~ ( * 2 (.) (.)
C D N D x T x p x T k x p Π − Π = − < − − = Π − Π   (51) 
Case 3)  (.)] (.) [ 2 ) ) ~ ( * ( 2 ) ~ ( 2 ) ~ ( * 2 (.) (.)
C D N D k x p x T k x p Π − Π = − < − − = Π − Π        (52) 
Case 4)  (.)] (.) [ 2 ) ~ ( 2 ) ~ ( * (.) (.)
C D N D x T k x p Π − Π = < − = Π − Π                                   (53) 
 
Proof. Inequalities (51) and (52) are immediately verified. Consider inequality (50). 
Recall that  ] 0 ), ~ ( * [ x p p
D
S =  occurs only if:  0 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * < − − x T k x p  (condition (39)). For 
inequality (50) not to hold it must be:  k k x T x p > − − ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * , but this contradicts 
condition (39). Therefore, condition (39) always implies inequality (50). Consider 
inequality (53). Recall that  ] 0 ), ~ ( ) ~ ( * [ x T k x p p
D
S + − =  occurs only if: 
0 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * < − − x T k x p  (condition (45)). For inequality (53) not to hold it must be:   27
) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( * x T x T k x p > − − , but this contradicts condition (45). Therefore, condition (45) 
always implies condition (53).                                                                                          ■                             
                 
Obviously, if suboptimal collusion regards not only consumers  x ~ and  x ~ 1−  but also, 
say, consumers  ' ~ x  and  ' ~ 1 x − ,  " ~ x  and  " ~ 1 x − , and so on, the previous result does not 
change: the difference between the deviation profits and the Nash profits is always less 
than the double of the difference between the deviation profits and the collusive profits. 
Define  W
~
 as the set of consumers served with suboptimal collusive discriminatory 
prices. From lemma 5) it follows: 
 
Ψ ≡ − Π − − Π < − Π − − Π ≡ Δ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈





N D x x x x x x x x             (54) 
 
Since it must be  X W W = ∪
~
, where X is the set of all consumers, and  ∅ = ∩W W
~
, 
putting together equation (34) and inequality (54) it follows:  
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Since  Ω = 2 Z  and  Ψ < Δ 2 , the critical discount factor is equal to 1/2 only when Ψ  
and Δ are equal to 0, that is, when  ∅ = W
~
, or, in other words, when all consumers are 
served with optimal collusive discriminatory prices. Conversely, when Ψ  and Δ are 
different from 0 (that is, when  ∅ ≠ W
~
), the critical discount factor is strictly greater 
than 1/2. The straightforward implication is that if optimal collusion is not sustainable, 
sub-optimal collusion is not sustainable too.  
 
Finally, consider the case of  2 1 = a . It implies  0 ) ~ ( = x T . Consider again conditions 
(38) – (45). It is immediate to see that conditions (38) and (40) are never verified.   28
Moreover, conditions (44) and (45) cannot be contemporaneously verified. It follows 
that cases 1), 2) and 4) never occur. Conversely, conditions (42) and (43) are always 
verified. Therefore, case 3) always occurs, and the deviation price schedule is given by: 
] ) ~ ( * ; ) ~ ( * [ k x p k x p p
D
S − − = . The deviation profits are:  k x p
D 2 ) ~ ( * 2 − = Π , while the 
punishment profits are:  0 = Π
N . It follows that: 
 
                               (.)] (.) [ 2 2 ) ~ ( * 2 (.) (.)
C D N D k x p Π − Π = − = Π − Π                       (55) 
 
When  2 1 = a  and firms collude in a suboptimal way, the difference between the 
deviation profits and the Nash profits is equal to the double of the difference between 
the deviation profits and the collusive profits. It follows that the critical discount factor 
is equal to 1/2.  
Note that these results are consistent with Proposition 2. Optimal collusion on a 
uniform price can be seen as a form of suboptimal collusion with respect to optimal 
collusion on discriminatory prices: Proposition 2 says that the critical discount factor is 
strictly larger than 1/2 when firms are differentiated and it is equal to 1/2 when firms are 
undifferentiated. In this section we have shown that any possible suboptimal collusive 
agreement induces a critical discount factor larger than 1/2 if firms are differentiated 
and equal to 1/2 if firms are undifferentiated.   
 
Suboptimal collusion on uniform price 
 
We consider now the second collusive scheme: firms collude on a uniform price to 
be applied to all consumers. What happens to the critical discount factor if firms collude 
on a suboptimal uniform collusive price? 
 
Proposition 3: the critical discount factor is a decreasing function of the collusive 
price. 
 
Proposition 3 implies that when optimal collusion is not sustainable, suboptimal 
collusion cannot be sustainable too, because it increases the critical discount factor. In 
what follows we prove Proposition 3.   29
 
Let 
C C p p ≤ ~  denote the collusive uniform price
22. When 
C C p p = ~  we are clearly in 
the optimal collusion case we described in section 4. Therefore, we concentrate on 
C C p p < ~ . First, since when 
C C p p = ~  all consumers are served, the same must be true 
when firms sub-optimally collude, that is when 
C C p p < ~ . The sub-optimal collusive 
profits of each firm are therefore the following: 
 





= Π                                                          (56) 
 
Now consider the deviation price. Suppose that firm A cheats. Define  U p ˆ  as the price 




x p u p u = . We get:  ) 4 2 2 1 ( ~ ˆ ax a x t p p
C
U + − − + = . The deviation 
price is therefore: 
 
                                { } )] 4 2 2 1 ( ~ *; min[ ; 0 max ~ ax a x t p p p
C D
U + − − + =                        (57) 
 
Before proceeding, note that the following equation is always true: 
= + − − + ) 4 2 2 1 ( ~ ax a x t p
C )] 4 2 2 1 ( ~ *; min[ ax a x t p p
C + − − + . The intuition is simple. 
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 show that:  * ) 4 2 2 1 ( p ax a x t p
C
< + − − + . Since 
C C p p < ~ , it 
must be:  * ) 4 2 2 1 ( ~ p ax a x t p
C < + − − + . Therefore, the deviation price is simply:  
 
                                      { } ) 4 2 2 1 ( ~ ; 0 max ~ ax a x t p p
C D
U + − − + =                                (58) 
 
Intuitively, the smaller is the suboptimal collusive uniform price the more difficult 
for the cheating firm is to steal a consumer without setting a price lower than the 
marginal cost. This allows us to derive a condition for the entire market to be served by 
the cheating firm. First, note that the second term in (58) is decreasing in x. Therefore, if 
                                                 
22 Note that we do not consider 
C C p p > ~ , because in this case the critical discount factor is 
unambiguously higher than under optimal collusion (see also footnote 18).   30
the consumer located in x is served by the deviating firm, all consumers located at the 
left of x must be served as well. The consumer located in x is served by the deviating 
firm when:  0 ) 4 2 2 1 ( ~ ≥ + − − + ax a x t p
C , from which it follows: 
 
                                                  ) ~ (
2
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x ζ ≡ +
−
≤                                      (59) 
 
On the contrary, if  ) ~ (
C p x ζ >  the consumer located in x cannot be stolen by the 
deviating firm. It follows that if  ) ~ (
C p ζ  is higher than 1, all consumers are served by 
firm A. By solving  1 ) ~ ( ≥
C p ζ  with respect to the price we obtain the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the whole market to be served by the deviating firm. This 
condition reduces to: 
 
                                                           ) 2 1 ( ~ a t p
C − ≥                                                  (60) 
 
Hence, if the suboptimal collusive uniform price is high enough (i.e. if condition (60) 
is satisfied) the entire market is served by the cheating market, otherwise a subset of 
consumers continues to be served by firm B. Incidentally, note that condition (60) is 
always satisfied when  2 1 = a . 
Suppose first that inequality (60) is satisfied. The deviation profits are the following 
(the subscript w indicates that the whole market is served by the deviating firm): 
 
                                       
C C D
w p dx ax a x t p ~ ] 4 2 2 1 ( ~ [ ~
1
0
= + − − + = Π ∫                           (61) 
 
By substituting equations (4), (56) and (61) into equation (1) we get the critical 
discount factor:  
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The derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the collusive price is the 
following: 
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)] 2 1 ( ~ 4 [
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Therefore, colluding on a suboptimal collusive uniform price increases the critical 
discount factor (or leaves it unchanged when firms are not differentiated), and this 
makes the collusive agreement less (or equally) sustainable.  
 
Suppose now that condition (60) does not hold. The deviating firm does not serve all 
consumers, but only the consumers located at the left of x*, where 1 ) ~ ( * < =
C p x ζ . 
Hence, the deviation profits are the following (the subscript f indicates that only a 
fraction of the market is served by the deviating firm): 
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By substituting equations (4), (56) and (64) into equation (1) we obtain the critical 
discount factor: 
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( a t Z − ≡ . After some manipulations, the derivative of the 
critical discount factor can be written as follows: 
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Since  0 > K  and  0 > Z , a sufficient condition for the derivative to be negative is 
0 2 ~ < − Z p
C . Note that this condition coincides with:  ) 2 1 ( ~ a t p
C − < , which is always 
satisfied when the deviating firm cannot serve the whole market (see condition (60)). 
Therefore, the derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to price is always 
negative. This means that lowering the collusive price below the optimal uniform 
collusive price makes the collusion less sustainable, even in the case in which the 





In this paper we have analyzed the relationship between the product differentiation 
degree and the sustainability of three different collusive schemes. The main innovation 
of our analysis is represented by the possibility for firms to perfectly price discriminate. 
We obtain the following results. The critical discount factor for the first collusive 
scheme (optimal collusion on discriminatory prices) is equal to 1/2 for any product 
differentiation degree. The second collusive scheme (optimal collusion on uniform 
price) is more difficult to sustain than the first, since the critical discount factor is 
between 1/2 and 2/3. Moreover, the greater is the product differentiation degree and the 
greater are the transportation costs, the greater is the critical discount factor: these 
findings contrast with previous results obtained under the hypothesis of uniform price 
(Chang, 1991; Chang, 1992 and Hackner, 1995). Finally, the sustainability of the third 
collusive scheme (collusion not to discriminate) does not depend on the product 
differentiation degree, and it is always equal to 2/3. In the last section we extend the 
model to consider the possibility for the firms to sub-optimally collude. Both when 
firms collude on a suboptimal discriminatory price schedule and when they collude on a 
suboptimal uniform price, the critical discount factor is always greater or equal to the 
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix we study the sustainability of the second and the third collusive 
scheme when imperfect direct price discrimination a la Liu and Serfes (2004, 2007) is 
assumed. Following Liu and Serfes (2004, 2007), we suppose that there is an 
information technology which allows firms to partition the consumers into different 
groups. We assume that the technology partitions the linear market into n sub-segments 
indexed by m, with  n m ,..., 1 = . Each sub-segment is of equal length,  n 1 . It follows that 










. A firm can price 
discriminate between consumers belonging to different sub-segments, but not between 
the consumers belonging to the same sub-segment. The cost of using the information 
technology is zero. Define with
J
m p  the price set by firm J=A,B on consumers belonging 




m p p ' = , 
' ,m m ∀ . Finally, assume that 
k n 2 = , with  ... 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = k  Therefore, n measures the 
precision of consumer information: an higher n means an higher information precision.  
 
The Nash profits are the following
23: 
 
                                    2
2
36
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n n a t N + − −
= Π                                              (67) 
 
The second collusive scheme. Suppose that firm A deviates. Assume that v is sufficiently 
high, so that it is always optimal for the deviating firm to serve the whole market. 
Therefore, the deviation price schedule is defined in such a way to make the consumers 
located at the endpoint of each sub-segment indifferent between buying from the 
deviating firm and the colluding firm
24. Such consumers are located at  n m , with 
                                                 
23 The Nash prices can be easily calculated following the proof of Proposition 1 in Liu and Serfes (2004): 
the only difference is that we allow firms being located at a at 1 – a instead of 0 and 1. Nash profits 
follow directly from the Nash prices. All the calculations are available from the author upon request. 
24 If the consumer located at the endpoint of a sub-segment receives the same utility from firm A and from 
firm B, it follows that all consumers in the same sub-segment at the left of such consumer receives a 
(strictly) higher utility from firm A than from firm B, because the transportation costs are lower.    34
n m ,..., 1 = , and the indifference condition is: 
2 2 ) 1 ( ) ( a
n
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C D + − − − = − − − , 
from which it follows:    
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The deviation profits are: 
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Inserting equations (12), (17), (67) and (68) into equation 1, we get the critical discount 
factor: 
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Differentiating  * δ  with respect to a and w we get respectively:  
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It is easy to see that for  8 ≥ n  the critical discount factor is decreasing both in a and w, 
while for  2 = n  and  4 = n  it in increasing both in a and w. Therefore, for a sufficiently 
high information quality, the more the firms are differentiated and the higher are the 
transportation costs, the less collusion is sustainable. 
 
The third collusive scheme. As before, suppose that firm A deviates and assume that v is 
sufficiently high, so that it is always optimal for the cheating firm to serve the whole 
market. Therefore, the deviation price schedule is obtained by solving the following 
indifference condition:  
2 2 ) 1 ( ) ( a
n
m
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The deviation profits are: 
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As for perfect price discrimination, the sustainability of collusion does depend neither 
on the product differentiation degree nor on transportation costs. 
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